This paper investigates whether the adoption of good corporate governance practices influences the market value of Brazilian firms. For this purpose, we used an unbalanced panel over the period from 2002 to 2010, composed of 233 listed nonfinancial companies, for a total of 1,110 observations. Because of endogeneity problems such as omitted variables, simultaneity and the feedback effect, we employed dynamic multiple linear regression models, estimated by the system generalized method of moments (System GMM). The results indicate that firms listed in one of the three premium corporate governance segments of the BM&FBovespa (Level 1, Level 2 and Novo Mercado) are priced higher by the market compared to firms listed in the traditional trading segment. Therefore, corporate governance has a positive effect on the market value of Brazilian firms.
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INTRODUCTION
ver the past three decades, the theme of corporate governance has gained increasing importance among academics and business leaders. Various factors have contributed to this trend. Becht, Bolton & Röell (2002) More recently, the global financial crisis of 2008, triggered by problems in the American subprime mortgage market and excessively leveraged banks, corroborated the importance of improving corporate governance. According to Silveira (2010) , besides excessively low interest rates and overly complex financial products, executive compensation systems linked to unsustainable results over the long run and failures of boards of directors also contributed to the crisis.
In Brazil, the liquidation by the Central Bank in the 1990s of large privately owned banks whose insolvency had been masked by fraudulent accounting heightened concern with improving corporate governance standards in the country (CARVALHO, 2002) . This preoccupation was an important factor leading to the creation of three premium listing segments in terms of governance requirements by the São Paulo Stock Exchange The problem of reverse causality can be mitigated by using instrumental variables, as in the studies of Black, Jang & Kim (2006) and Silveira, Barros & Famá (2006) . However, it is hard to find a set of valid instruments because while the first assumption, of a significant correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressor, is easily verified, the second, of no correlation between the instruments and the model's error term, is not easy to check, since the error is not directly observable (BARROS et al., 2010) . Black, Jang & Kim (2006) formulated an indicator to approximate the quality of governance practices of 525 South Korean companies, among other aspects covering stockholders' rights, the structure of the board of directors and the transparency in disclosing information. By employing regressions calculated by ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares (2SLS) and three-stage least squares (3SLS), the authors found evidence that corporate governance is able to explain the market value of the firms studied.
Silveira, Barros & Famá (2006) also applied multiple regressions estimated by OLS, 2SLS and 3SLS, to a sample of 154 Brazilian companies in 2000. As a proxy for the quality of governance practices they used an index calculated from a set of 20 objective binary questions. Their results indicated that governance quality has a positive influence on Tobin's Q and the price-to-book-value ratio and that rising market value can lead to the adoption of better governance standards by organizations (i.e., two-way causality between governance quality and valuation).
Finally, the feedback effect of the response variables to the regressors occurs when the (BARROS et al., 2010) . According to Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2008) , this problem is also known as "dynamic endogeneity" in corporate finance studies and can be mitigated by the inclusion of lags of the explained variable in the regression model, as done in the generalized method of moments (GMM). Wintoki, Linck & Netter (2008) , in using fixed-effects analysis of a panel of 6,000
American companies, found a significant relationship between the structure of the board of directors and corporate performance. However, when they employed a system generalized method of moments (System GMM), size and level of board independence did not influence the return on sales or Tobin's Q. In turn, Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011) 
METHODS
The main objective of this article is to investigate the relation between the adoption of accounting standards applicable to these firms, making it hard to compare the profitability and valuation metrics against those of companies in other sectors. We also excluded firms that reported negative equity in any year, since this would impair calculation of some indicators, like ROE and ROIC.
The final sample was composed of 233 firms for which all the data were available to calculate the variables in at least two years in the period analyzed. Therefore, we formed an unbalanced panel of 1,110 firm-year observations, although in the regression models the number of observations declined to 788 because of the estimation by the system generalized method of moments (System GMM). Brazilian firms typically issue more than one type of stock (e.g., common and preferred), we selected the stock with highest liquidity in the respective year to calculate some market indicators.
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF THE STUDY'S VARIABLES
The choice of the dependent, independent and control variables used was based on the The first, Tobin's Q, is hard to operationalize due to the inability to directly observe the market value of debts and replacement value of assets. Therefore, we chose the approximation proposed by Chung & Pruitt (1994: p. 72 ), according to which Tobin's Q can be calculated by Equation (1):
Where:
MVC: market value of the firm's common shares;
MVP: market value of the firm's preferred shares;
DEBT: book value of total debt (short-and long-term) minus current assets after exclusion of inventories.
The second proxy used was the enterprise value over total assets, obtained by Equation
(*) Enterprise value = market value of total shares + short-and long-term bonds + short-and long-term loans + advances on foreign exchange contracts -cash and cash equivalents.
Calculated by Economática ® .
CONTROL VARIABLES
We also used the following control variables:
 Profitability (operational performance). We used three profitability measures: (i) return on invested capital (ROIC); (ii) return on equity (ROE); and earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization over total assets (EBITDA/TA), calculated, respectively, by Equations (3), (4) and (5): (**) AIC = average stockholders' equity + average gross debt *** (***) Average of short-and long-term loans + short-and long-term bonds
EBITDA/TA = ( )×100%
( 5)  Leverage (LEV): measured by the sum of current and long-term liabilities divided by total assets at the end of the year.
 Volatility (VOLAT): measured by the monthly returns of the most liquid type of stock of each firm in each year, obtained by Equation (6):
: continuous monthly return of stock i; : average of the continuous monthly returns of stock i; and n = 12 (one year).
 Payout index (PAYOUT): defined as dividends paid per share over net earnings per
share at the end of the year.
 Liquidity index (LIQ):
Calculated by the Economática ® system for periods of 12 months, based on the trading volume of each stock, obtained by Equation (7):
p: number of days when there was at least one trade of the stock in the period analyzed; P: total number of days in the period analyzed; n: number of trades of the stock in the period We also used annual dummy variables (YEAR), with value of one for the specific year and zero for other years, with the aim isolating the macroeconomic effects that affected the companies during the study period. They are coded in chronological order: D02 = 2002, D03
= 2003 and so on.
MODELS AND STATISTICAL TREATMENT
To ascertain whether the adoption of enhanced corporate governance practices influences the firms' market value, we employed dynamic multiple linear regression models, estimated by the system generalized method of moments (System GMM). For this purpose we used the Stata ® 11 statistical package, applying the xtabond2 tool of Roodman (2006 Roodman ( , 2009 .
As a proxy for market value (MV), the dependent variable, we used Tobin's Q (QTOBIN) and enterprise value over total assets (EV/TA). Equation (8) 
In the formula, α is the intercept, which can be interpreted as the average specific effect of the set of firms, i and t represent, respectively, the firm and year, and + represents the decomposition of the random error term ( = + ). More specifically, is the error term of firm i in year t and is the unobserved heterogeneity of the firms in the sample, to capture any unobserved characteristics of firm i that do not vary over time.
Model (8) (2006, 2009) , with employment of the laglimits (3 3) function. Tables 1 and 2 (654) represents more than half of the total (1,110). Besides this, the group of companies listed in one of the special governance segments presented higher means and medians of Tobin's Q and for enterprise value over total assets than the other set of firms. Table 3 shows the results of the dynamic multiple linear regression models, estimated by the System GMM, to explain the market value (Tobin's Q or enterprise value over total assets). In the six equations tested, the variables QTOBIN and EV/TA were positively influenced by their lagged values (L.QTOBIN and L.(EV/TA)), at 1% significance. These results indicate inertial behavior of the firms' market value.
RESULTS

MARKET VALUE AND ADOPTION OF ENHANCED GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
With respect to the independent variable of interest, CGQ obtained positive and significant coefficients at 1% in five of the six specifications employed. These results suggest that the adoption of enhanced corporate governance practices has a positive effect on market value. More specifically, these results indicate that on average the firms listed in one of the premium governance segments (L1, L2 or NM) are more valued by the market than are firms listed in the traditional trading segment.
Hence, it can be inferred that the higher market value of the firms listed in the L1, L2
and NM segments results from their adherence to higher corporate governance standards, mainly in relation to protection of minority shareholders and transparency in the disclosure of information, meaning less pronounced information asymmetry, increasing demand for their shares. This hypothesis is consistent with the results of Carvalho & Pennacchi (2012) abnormal return of the stocks of these firms during the period around the announcement of the migration. Furthermore, the results of Carvalho & Pennacchi (2012) indicate that migration increased the trading volume of nonvoting shares of the firms, suggesting that better disclosure increases the liquidity of these shares.
Regarding the variables used as proxies for operational performance, EBITDA over total assets was significant at 1% in the two models in which it was used, while ROIC The System GMM does not assume normal distribution of the variables and is robust to heteroscedasticity of the error term. However, for the results of the models used to be valid, some assumptions must be satisfied. According to Arellano & Bond (1991) , the System GMM requires first-order but not second-order autocorrelation in the residuals. As shown in Table 3 , the Arellano-Bond test for first-and second-order autocorrelation of the residuals, respectively, rejected and accepted the null hypothesis of the absence of serial autocorrelation for all the specifications.
Another fundamental condition is that the instruments must be validated. For this, two conditions are necessary: the instruments of the models must be correlated with the contemporaneous values of the variables of each respective equation, and the instruments must be exogenous, i.e., they cannot be correlated with the contemporaneous error terms (ARELLANO; BOVER, 1995; BLUNDELL; BOND, 1998) . As seen in Table 3 , the Hansen test for overidentification (J-statistic) did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are valid in all the specifications, for the conventional significance levels (1%, 5% and 10%) and for the 25% level indicated by Roodman (2009) . Likewise, the difference-inSargan/Hansen test for subsets of the instruments (C-statistic) in all the models also did not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments of each subgroup are exogenous, even at the 25% significance level. The variable D10 was excluded by Stata 11 due to problems of collinearity. We used the two-step and robust commands (correction for standard errors of Windmeijer (2005)) to make the estimation more robust. Significance: ***(1%); **(5%); *(10%). Because of the momentum conditions, even though the System GMM permits correlation between the regressors and unobserved heterogeneity ( ), the method assumes that the form of this correlation does not change between periods (T) (steady state assumption) (ROODMAN, 2009) . The validity of this condition, according to Roodman (2009) , depends on the coefficient of the first lag of the response variable being smaller (in absolute value) than one (| | < 1.0), which was true in all of the specifications.
To finalize, we stress that to control for the proliferation of instruments, we applied the laglimits (3 3) function of the xtabond2 tool (ROODMAN, 2006; . This command reduced the number of instruments used in all the models (104) so that it was substantially smaller than the number of observations (788), assuring the robustness of the results.
CONCLUSION
The main objective of this article was to investigate whether the adoption of enhanced corporate governance practices influenced the market value of Brazilian companies during the period from 2002 to 2010. Due to the endogeneity problems that affect corporate finance studies, such as omitted variables, reverse causality and the feedback effect, we tested dynamic multiple linear regression models, estimated by the system generalized method of moments.
The statistics indicate that better corporate governance had a positive effect on the firms' market value, as also found by Black, Jang & Kim (2006) , Silveira, Barros & Famá (2006) and Ammann, Oesch & Schmid (2011) . More specifically, we found that on average firms listed in the Level 1, Level 2 or Novo Mercado trading segments of the BM&FBovespa were more highly valued by the market during the study period than those listed in the traditional segment.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the higher market value of these firms resulted from adherence to practices mainly focused on protection of minority stockholders and more transparent information disclosure, such as: maintenance of a minimum free float of 25%; the launch of public offerings by mechanisms that favor dispersion of capital; stronger tag-along rights than the legal requirement (L2 and NM); consolidation and special review of balance sheets; and disclosure of information on contracts with related parties and shareholders'
agreements.
The listing in one of these three segments, as pointed out by Carvalho & Pennacchi (2012) , should act as a signal to the market of reduced information asymmetry, among other 
